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Introduction 
THE LIMITS OF FRENCH INTERVENTION IN AFRICA: 
A STUDY IN APPLIED NEO-COLONIALISM 
by 
Edouard Bustin 
The scope of this paper is both wider and narrower than might be suggested 
by its title. It does not propose to offer a full analysis of French neo-
colonialism, but neither will it be limited to a mere inventory of overt 
French military actions of the type recently performed in Chad, Shaba or the 
Central African Republic. Part of the ambiguity that the title of the paper 
may occasion lies in the use of the term "intervention," which will be used to 
designate a wide-ranging sequence of policy actions leading, whether deliber-
ately or not, to the crystallization of France's current posture in Africa.* 
In its broadest sense, "intervention" can, and probably should, include 
every form of concerted action (whether direct or indirect, overt or covert) 
by one international actor on another for the purpose of altering, in a manner 
favorable to the intervenor, the normal processes of operation in the targeted 
society. In this perspective, it would be legitimate to claim that interven-
tion, or intrusion, by France or by other external powers in the affairs of 
Africa begins almost from the moment when they first established contact with 
African societies. The setting up of the slave trade itself was not intrinsi-
cally perceived as interventionist, inasmuch as slaves were at that time 
regarded by both sides as a legitimate trade commodity, but the supply of 
firearms to native intermediaries who were expected to use their newly-
acquired technological superiority to pillage the hinterland in the forcible 
procurement of slaves, or the exploitation of rivalries between indigenous 
trading states were all forms of "intervention." Similarly, the imposition of 
direct colonial rule and the attendant (and forcible) introduction of new 
modes of production in African societies were clearly interventionist, as was 
the later development of a colonial apparatus, with its mobilizational and 
surplus-extracting effects. 
* This essay was completed in March 1981, shortly before the election of 
President Mitterand and of the present Socialist administration in France. 
Though unintentional, this coincidence is nevertheless fortunate since these 
developments may be viewed as signaling the end of the Gaullist and post-
Gaullist eras. This is not meant to suggest that France's African policies 
are now likely to be dramatically reversed, but early indications show that 
the new administration's approaches and priorities may be significantly 
different from those of its prodecessors. 
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The purpose of the preamble is to remind the reader that there is, in 
fact, no hiatus, no solution of logical continuity in the history of Western 
(and thus French) expansion in the rest of the world, including Africa. From 
the slave trade to 11classic 11 colonialism and to the present state of relations 
between the industrialized world and Africa (referred to as "nee-colonialism" 
for the sake of brevity) runs a continuous, unbroken skein of concerted 
coercion--intervention, in short--which, over the centuries, has assumed many 
procedural forms but which, taken as a whole, represents a set of inter-
related, adaptable, tactically flexible processes governed by an ongoing 
logic, and of which "intervention" in the narrow conventional sense (Chad, 
Kolwezi, Bangui, etc.) represents only a very tiny aspect. 
In the course of imperialism, as in most other human endeavors, the 
initial steps are usually those that require the least complex methodology. 
The initial establishment of unequal trade relations with Africa, for 
instance, involved only a relatively unsubtle mix of force and cunning. 
Later, the establishment of outright colonial occupation required, in addition 
to these same fundamental ingredients, a higher degree of technological 
sophistication to cope with the logistical problems of actual conquest and 
physical occupation of the land. Logistical problems (and corresponding 
policies) reached a new level of complexity when the emphasis shifted from the 
conquest and occupation of tropical lands to the development of the material, 
administrative and ideological infrastructure needed to manage and exploit the 
areas thus brought under control. Finally, for the imperial power to complete 
the process by bringing subjugated territories to the point where, as in a 
modern zoo, the inmates are no longer caged yet remain captive because of 
skillfully concealed restraints (whether material or mental) requires the 
marshalling of a much wider array of control techniques than was found in the 
conqueror's crude arsenal. In terms of sophistication, the gap is as wide as 
that between the slave driver's whip and chains and the implanting of elec-
trodes in the brain. 
In its attempt to acquire, retain and preserve its control over substatial 
portions of the globe, France has been no different from other imperialists. 
Tactically, however, it has resorted to some specific devices, and although 
the range of control techniques used by any power to secure its goals may be 
finite, some powers have resorted to a wider spectrum of techniques than 
others, or have combined them in an idiosyncratic manner. 
Roots of French Imperial Policy 
French imperialism in the 19th century was aggressive and vigorous, but it 
was also in many ways archaic, even at that time, and its visibility concealed 
its contradictions. To the eyes of the world, France appeared as Britain's 
only credible rival, and this was especially true in Africa, where the expanse 
of purple (denoting French control) seemed a match for the large patches which 
British imperialists were coloring in red on the map of the continent. To 
what extent the success of France's territorial expansion in Africa was due to 
Germany's deliberate absention, and to Bismarck's shrewd policy of diverting 
French energies away from la revanche while Germany consolidated its power in 
Europe, is an academic question, but it is fair to suggest that France's 
African empire--not to mention Belgium's or Portugal's--might have been 
significantly curtailed if Bismarck had been more of a "Kolonialmensch." 
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The size of France's African empire overshadowed the fact that, in other 
parts of the world, France was far less successful. Indochina, the only 
possession acquired in Asia, paled in comparison with Britain's South Asian 
raj and even with Holland's Indonesian empire. Until the end of World War I, 
when France demanded a share of the Ottoman Empire's spoils and was conceded 
temporary control over the non-oil-producing portion of the "fertile 
crescent, 11 she had no holdings of any importance between Tunis and Saigon--a 
region directly or indirectly subject to British influence. 
Furthermore, in areas which, for various reasons, could not be brought 
under outright colonial control (e.g., China, the Ottoman Empire, or Latin 
America)--and where Western imperialism operated in a manner which, in many 
ways, prefigured contemporary nee-colonialism in Africa--France's economic and 
political influence was reduced to far more modest proportions in comparison 
with that of Britain, the U.S. or Germany. The French bourgeoisie invested 
massively in Russia, China or the Near East, but the real capitalist entre-
preneurs were the British, the Americans, the Germans, or even the Belgians 
(who, before World War I, were far more busily engaged in building railroads 
and factories in China, Russia, Latin America or Egypt than in developing 
Leopold's Free State). Even in Africa, where France successfully acquired 
extensive "real estate," economic development or exploitation (mise en valeur) 
lagged significantly behind British or Belgian achievements, and with the 
limited exceptions of North Africa and Senegal, it was not until after World 
War II that France was in a position to initiate a systematic exploitation of 
the economic resources of its African empire. 
To say that France was not as effective in propagating the development of 
a capitalist mode of production in its African empire as some of the other 
imperialist powers does not mean that she was not motivated by economic 
considerations, but simply that her preoccupations were, in some respect, 
different from those of Britain, Belgium (or Portugal), and also that non-
economic considerations may have played a larger role in the shaping of 
France's colonial policies. In fact, it may be pointless to try and determine 
with any degree of precision the relative mix of economic and non-economic 
factors in any given power's colonial policies, but we should at the very 
least be aware of the fact that each component of a given power's policies 
reflects to a significant degree the idiosyncratic interests (and the idiosyn-
cratic perception of such interests) of that particular power. 
In France's case, it is important to perceive that colonial expansion took 
place entirely during a period where the country had been made painfully aware 
of her gradual decline (first after the Napoleonic wars, and again, far more 
bitterly, after the Franco-Prussian war). The relative demographic decline of 
what had once been la grande nation (in the sense of its having a larger 
population than any other European state) was only one facet of that phenome-
non, but one that became particularly obsessive after 1870, and again after 
World War I, and accounts in part for France's penchant for assimilationism, 
which, alone, could justify her self-image as la France de 100 millions 
d'habitants. 
Another feature of France's imperial expansion (already touched upon 
earlier) is that it was initiated by a state whose economic dynamism and level 
of industrial maturity was relatively less than that of its major actual or 
potential rivals, Protectionism and autarky, both traditional features of 
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French economic policy dating back to the Ancien Regime and dramatized by 
Napoleon's continental blockade, were systematically applied to France's 
African empire, and indeed, continued to figure as a major preoccupation in 
the shaping of her decolonization and post-colonial policies. 
The French military also played a distinctive, and somewhat ambiguous, 
role in the shaping of French imperial attitudes. For each colonial power, of 
course, the military necessarily played a decisive role in the conquest of 
overseas empires, but although France may have had to muster greater amounts 
of military force than other colonial powers in securing control of her 
African possessions, this would not in itself account for the singular role of 
the military class in the development of France's vision of her African 
empire. The distinctive feature in this respect is the fact that, unlike its 
British counterpart, the French military was used and encouraged in overseas 
missions partly as a way of deflecting its restlessness from civilian regimes 
from which it felt alienated. France's conquest of Algeria provided an outlet 
for a military class which, remembering the heady days of Napoleon, felt only 
scorn for the deliberately non-bellicose postures of the Bourbon and Orleans 
monarchies. Despite its famous disclaimer ("L'Empire, c'est la Paix"), the 
Second Empire provided the military with far more frequent opportunities to 
indulge in their favorite activity--including a full-fledged, but ultimately 
disastrous colonial cmapaign in Mexico--but the Third Republic, which was 
almost constantly under the threat of a military pronunciamento during the 
first twenty-five years of its existence, found imperial expansion a useful 
diversion for the pent-up energies of its potentially disloyal officer corps. 
In a different context, the place which French Africa (and particularly 
Chad) occupied in the re-emergence of a Free French military force fighting on 
the side of the Allies was a significant factor in convincing France's postwar 
military establishment (many of whose members had earned their spurs with the 
Free French forces) of Africa's vital strategic importance. In time, of 
course, the French military became deeply embroiled in colonial wars and 
ultimately came to control not only the direction of France's colonial policy, 
but even the fate of the regime itself. But, even though the military finally 
came to accept the merits of De Gaulle's conversion to neo-colonialism, its 
thinking has continued to influence the views of French policy-makers, not 
only with respect to the need of maintaining a military presence in Africa, 
but also, more generally, thorough the geopolitical form of strategic consid-
erations which appear to have dominated France's African policies, not only 
since World War II, but over the past hundred years. 
In the shaping of those geopolitical views, the dominant themes reflect 
France's traditional perspective as a land-based rather than sea-going power: 
it includes references to 11land bridges, 11 to the need to maintain overland 
11access 11 and communications between the different parts of France's sphere of 
influence, or to the danger of having one's strategic positions outflanked or 
turned from the rear. At various points, "real estate" such as Chad, 
Mauritania, the Algerian Sahara, Niger, Mali and even the Central African 
Republic have been discussed in such terms. 
Finally, one should keep in mind the tradition of legal and political 
unification, and of administrative centralization which the French state had 
inherited partly from the days of absolute monarchy, and most directly from 
the Jacobin and Napoleonic eras. The patterns of authoritarian 
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nation-building initiated by the first Republic were pursued by Napoleon to 
their logical ends and revived by the Republicans when they finally took 
control of the state. Imbued with an unwavering sense of the universal 
validity of the French Revolution's ideological premises (les grands principes 
de '89), 19th century Republicans held on to the belief that France's special 
mission was to disseminate these premises throughout the world. Napoleon was 
abhorred for having diverted the ideals of the Revolution for the purpose of 
building up his personal power, but few Republicans seemed to perceive that 
France's failure to export its revolution had been due to the fact that it had 
been promoted at the point of a gun (la revolution botee). In fact, many of 
them appeared to believe that no matter how much coercion had to be used to 
force them into the French orbit, the peoples of the world would, as soon as 
they had been properly enlightened, come to be thankful for having been made 
to discover the excellence of French ideas and institutions, since these were, 
in any case, of universal applicability. 
Despite the precedents that could be found for it in the Ancien Regime, 
assimilation was, in fact, the child of the Enlightenment and of the 
Revolution, as evidenced by the fact that assimilation policies were reacti-
vated and promoted--at least verbally--with each new upsurge of political 
liberalism in France. Although France quickly reached the limits of its 
assimilationist rhetoric when its empire expanded from Algiers to the banks of 
the Congo, the policy survived in the form of a theoretical anchor which 
enabled France to maintain a liberal posture (at least in her own eyes), by 
insisting that her colonial subjects would one day enjoy "the freedom of 
Frenchmen in France." 
This latter formula, used by Rene Pleven at the 1944 Brazzaville 
Conference, was, in fact used in a highly restrictive and somewhat ominous 
context: for France's colonial subjects, he warned, "there could be no other 
freedom" than that which France offered to its own citizens, and he took pains 
to make it clear that "any form of self-government, now or in the future, is 
to be ruled out." Although the 1946 Constitution went on to offer internal 
self-government to the states of Indo-China (which promptly declined it in 
favor of pursuing their struggle for full independence), and devised more 
liberal terms of association with the Union Fran~aise for Morocco and Tunisia 
(and even, after a fashion, for Togo and Cameroun), France's sub-Saharan 
African possessions remained firmly anchored in their status of Overseas 
Territories, or TOMs (a term euphemistically substituted for "colonies"), and 
as such remained part of the French Republic, "one and indivisible. 111 
In strictly legal terms, therefore, any demands for independence by 
France's African possessions were not only illegitimate but treasonable, as 
would be the advocacy of secession by Alsatians or Corsicans. The only 
legitimate path of emancipation open to the TOMs under the terms of the 4th 
Republic's Constitution was that of requesting "the freedom of Frenchmen in 
France" by achieving full and formal integration in the French Republic as an 
Overseas Departement (DOM), as was done in 1946 by the Indian Ocean island of 
Reunion. Meanwhile, the logic of integration dictated that the proper forum 
for the discussion of the TOMs' problems was the French National Assembly, 
where they were represented (or rather, underrepresented) by a handful of 
deputies, and where a whole generation of African leaders, some of whom are 
still in power, learned to manipulate (while being simultaneously manipulated 
by) the French political system. 
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The election of these overseas representatives was based, until 1956, on a 
limited form of franchise combined with an ostensibly non-racial division of 
the electorate into two separate voter rolls (double college), one for the 
French and those few Africans who qualified for full citizenship, and the 
other for the rest of the population who met the restrictive conditions of 
suffrage. Furthermore, in keeping with an honored tradition which had been 
applied in France itself under the Second Empire and perpetuated in Algeria 
under the Third Republic, elections in the overseas constituencies were quite 
regularly manipulated by the administration, whether (in the case of the 
"European" seats) by making them "safe" for candidates affiliated with the 
ruling coalition, or (in the case of the "African" seats) by promoting the 
election of "moderates 11 --i.e., supportive of, or explicitly affiliated with, 
the governing parties--and by discouraging the election of "radicals." This 
practice, usually predicated on the administration's ability to manipulate the 
notables who, in turn, would deliver the votes, became far more difficult to 
apply when universal suffrage ( and the single roll) were introduced in 1956, 
but it could still be resorted to in remote areas such as Niger, where it was 
responsible for Djibo Bakary's election in 1956, as well as for his downfall 
in 1958. 
Centralization, which made some sense in an assimilationist perspective 
(since the official fate of the TOMs was to be eventually integrated in a 
system that was itself highly centralized), also led France to consider its 
African policy as an aggregate whole which, like the Republic itself, was one 
and indivisible. Thus, any reforms in these policies, such as the Lamine 
Gueye Acts or the Deferre Loi-Cadre of 1956, were invariably and automatically 
applied to all African territories, irrespective of the inchoateness or of the 
sophistication of local political forces. 
From Colonialism to Neo-colonialism 
Even though, for obvious reasons of political convenience, the 5th 
Republic likes to trace back the origins of French decolonization policy to 
its own founding hero's vague utterances at the 1944 Brazzaville Conference 
(which, incidentally, no Africans attended), there is no doubt that, in 
sub-Saharan Africa, real decolonization begins only with the 1955 Statut du 
Togo and, more explicitly, with the 1956 Loi-Cadre (or Deferre Act). The 
preamble of the 1946 Constitution (which De Gaulle had opposed) talked vaguely 
of France 1 s intention "to lead the people in its charge to the freedom of 
administering themselves and to democratically run their own affairs," but 
other provisions made it clear that the TOMs continued to be integral parts of 
the Re pub lie. 
The turning point of French policy came with the May 1954 defeat at Dien 
Bien-Phu, followed six months later by the outbreak of the Algerian liberation 
struggle. In the meantime, a left-of-center coalition led by Pierre Mendes-
France had come to power in Paris and had initiated a political process which, 
aside from putting a final seal on France's loss of Indochina, sought to come 
to terms with the Moroccan and Tunisian nationalists. Compared to the 
problems of North Africa, Black Africa seemed remote and quiescent, and its 
aspirations did not appear as a high priority. It was only to the extent that 
British decolonization policy in West Africa indirectly posed a challenge to 
French rule in Cameroun and Togo that Mendes-France's successor, Edgar Faure, 
had to concern himself with that part of the world. Since the U.K. proposed 
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to discharge its Trusteeship responsibilities toward British-administered 
Togoland and Cameroons by integrating them, respectively, with Ghana and 
Nigeria, which had become self-governing in 1954 and were earmarked for prompt 
independence, France was under some pressure from the U.N. to match British 
reforms in its own portions of Togo and Cameroun. 
The French response was to extend to these two territories (which were not 
strictly TOMs, but "Associated Territories" in the intricate nomenclature of 
the Union Francaise) the very same degree of self-government granted to their 
British-administered counterparts through the 1955 Statuts of Togo and 
Cameroun. Like Britain at that stage, France retained control of the terri-
tories' diplomatic and external economic relations, defense, currency and 
financial obligations, together with a number of other items covering more or 
less the same areas as Britain's own "reserved powers. 11 The important 
difference, however, was that whereas in the case of British West Africa, 
internal self-government was viewed merely as a transitional stage, soon 
destined to give way to full independence, France apparently had no intention, 
at least at that stage, of going through with the last phase of the decoloni-
zation exercise. In fact, in Cameroun, where a nationalist uprising had been 
launched in the meantime, implementation of the Statut was purely and simply 
suspended until "law and order" could be restored. 
The 1956 decision to replicate the Togo experiment in all Overseas 
Territories was, therefore, remarkably bold and (by French standards) innova-
tive. The 1956 Loi-Cadre simply proposed to extend internal self-government 
to all the TOMs, giving them, in fact (if not explicitly) the status of Etats 
Associes, which France had vainly offered to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia ten 
years earlier. Although France was to retain the same extensive prerogatives 
as in the case of Togo, and although any mention of independence (which would 
have called for a constitutional revision) was carefully avoided, the Loi-
Cadre implicitly yet irrevocably acknowledged that the TOMs' eventual integra-
tion into the French Republic as Overseas Departments (which had been the only 
officially sanctioned path of emancipation open to them) would, in fact, never 
take place, since it was clearly unrealistic to expect that the TOMs should 
ever wish to exchange their newly-acquired autonomy to the narrowly subordi-
nate status of a French department. Although a few far-sighted French 
statesmen, such as Mitterrand, Buron and possibly Deferre, seem to have been 
aware of the fact that self-government would one day lead to independence, 
that latter outcome was still, constitutionally-speaking, as illegitimate as 
ever. In the eyes of the French political class, some kind of permanent, 
institutionalized association with France (a Commonwealth a la franc;aise, as 
some writers put it, in blissful ignorance of what the Commonwealth had 
become) represented the absolute and final limit of French concessions. 
That "Commonwealth a la fran~aise" took shape, in unexpected circum-
stances, and much sooner than had been anticipated, when the Fourth Republic 
collapsed and when DeGaul le grandiosely offered a "new Deal" to the African 
territories in the form of a Franco-African Communaute. In its original 
version, the community project simply reaffirmed the autonomy granted to the 
African territories by the Loi-Cadre and proposed that matters falling under 
French jurisdiction should now be handled jointly by "community" institutions 
in which, however, France (and particularly its President) continued to hold 
final decision-making power. The project's only striking innovation was that 
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Africans were invited to express their acceptance of this 11new" arrangement by 
ratifying the 1958 Constitution (of which only one section actually applied to 
them), with the understanding that any territory that did not would be allowed 
to secede, but only at the cost of severe economic penalties (including the 
loss of French aid). 
In De Gaulle's view, adhesion to the community, once made, would be 
irrevocable and the option to secede would not be offered again, but some of 
his European and African advisers convinced him that, put in those terms, the 
option of immediate independence might be too tempting to resist, and he 
accordingly agreed that the door to the community would remain permanently 
unlocked, for any members who so wished to walk out at some future point, as 
long as they we.-e ready to face the economic penalties, which De Gaulle 
refused to mitigate. The project also allowed the African member states to 
acquire, through negotiation, any of the prerogatives initally reserved for 
the community. Unofficial interpretations of this clause made it clear that 
no single item of sovereignty would be excluded from this process of negoti-
ated transfer, which meant, as the African states quickly realized, that the 
community's (i.e., France's) reserved powers could be gradually whittled away 
and that it might be possible for them to acquire through negotiation rather 
than outright secession all the elements of full sovereignty that they still 
lacked. 
In the light of those amendments, all the African states (except Guinea, 
which chose to defy De Gaulle, partly for internal reasons, and Niger, where 
ratification was achieved largely through French manipulation, but including 
Togo and Cameroun) overwhelmingly chose membership in the community. Almost 
immediately, however, (and despite Houphouet' s hasty announcement that the 
community had once and for all exorcised the temptation of independence), it 
bacame obvious that some of the African states regarded the new arrangement as 
purely transitory and that, having humored De Gaulle by their massive endorse-
ment of 11his" constitution, they now intended to resume their progress toward 
independence. 
Before reaching that point, however, leaders such as Senghor, Keita and 
others were hoping to arrest the trend toward balkanization which had been 
triggered by the Loi-Cadre and amplified by the community, but their attempts 
to salvage the supra-territorial links that France itself had developed for 
its own convenience at the turn of the century now ran into the opposition of 
the wealthier territories (Ivory Coast, Gabon) and found no sympathy in 
Paris. Only Senegal and Soudan persisted (for a time) in their effort to 
build a "Mali Federation," but when it became apparent that no other state 
would join them, Senghor and Keita shifted their sights to the issue of 
independence. Their strategy was to demand a negotiated transfer of al 1 
community prerogatives to the Mali Federation, thereby achieving full sover-
eignty without ever leaving the community. 
The procedure called for some extraordinary amount of casuistry and 
double-talk on the part of all protagonists, since its outcome would be an 
independent state which, not having left the community, would remain a member 
(and thus qualify for continued assistance), even though the constitution 
explicitly stated that, by becoming independent, an African state would cease 
to be a member of the community (art. 86). Senghor and Keita made it clear, 
however, that if France refused to go along with their strategies, they would 
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unilaterally declare independence (as was their right under the "permanently 
open door" clause of the 1958 constitution). Guinea's example served as a 
useful reminder that such a threat should not be taken lightly, and with his 
usual realism, De Gaulle promptly resigned himself to accept in September, 
1959, what he had so adamantly rejected in September, 1958--namely, that 
independence could be reconciled with membership in the community, despite the 
wording of art. 86. 
For the sake of safeguarding appearances, however, the offending article 
was promptly altered (thanks to a prescient clause which allowed an abbrevi-
ated procedure for the amendment of all sections dealing with the community) 
and, on June 20, 1960, the Mali Federation achieved independence as a member 
of the community, promptly followed by the four Equatorial republics and by 
Madagascar, which had immediately requested the benefit of the precedent 
established for Mali. Houhouet-Boigny, who had loudly proclaimed his complete 
satisfaction with the original terms of the community, refused to follow 
Mali's lead but, in grudging acknowledgement of the mystique of independence, 
and also as a face-saving device, he now announced that the Ivory Coast would 
not negotiate its independence with France, but rather proclaim it uni-
laterally (a risk-free posture since art. 86 had been amended a few days 
earlier). 
His move was thankfully emulated by Ivory Coast's Entente clients (Niger, 
Upper Volta and Dahomey) which had found the Houphouet line increasingly hard 
to justify to their domestic critics. The Entente states now declined to 
rejoin the revamped community which Houphouet regarded (with some justifi-
cation) as an empty shell. Instead, each of them signed a set of bilateral 
cooperation agreements with France, replicating in every respect the bilateral 
cooperation agreements which Mali, Madagascar and the four ex-AEF states had 
signed earlier in the process of negotiating the terms of their independence. 
The bilateral cooperation agreements which, despite subsequent revisions, 
still provide the essential foundation of France's ubiquitous influence in the 
affairs of its former African possessions, covered precisely those areas of 
jurisdiction which had been reserved for France under the Loi-Cadre (or for 
the community under the 1958 constitution), and which the African states had 
just acquired through the process of achieving nominal independence--i.e., 
external relations, defense, currency, international trade and finance, 
strategic raw materials, judicial review, higher education, long-distance 
transportation and· telecommunications. For every one, or nearly every one of 
these items, bilateral agreements couched in almost identical terms estab-
lished the parameters of France's continuing role in the affairs of her former 
dependencies. In other words, those areas of sovereignty which France had 
explicitly retained for itself in 1956 in its capacity as colonial ruler, then 
had continued to control after 1958 through its dominant position in the 
community, and which had just been transferred proforma to the African states 
were now returned, unopened, by these same African states to be again depos-
ited into French hands for safeguarding, like a minor's inheritance. As 
approvingly noted by a French official: 
It was through the transfer of similar areas of jurisdic-
tion that the African and Malagasy members of the 
Community achieved independence during the course of 
1960. But it was also these same areas of jurisdiction 
which provided the outlines of the domain to be covered by 
cooperation. French cooperation quite naturally 
appeared as indispensible in these various sectors. Thus 
were concluded the agreements relating to diplomacy 
defense, currency, etc. Accordingly, while there may have 
been a mutation in the nature of the relationship, which 
changed from being institutional to being contractual, one 
can hardly claim that there has been a break between 
France and her African partners over essential matters. 
These have continued to receive special treatment since 
the (African) states have requested French assistance or 
accepted harmonization with French policy in those 
areas2. 
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One of the most distinctive features of France's "special relationship" 
with its former African dependencies has been its reliance on explicit legal 
ins truments--which may be a reflection of France I s "written law" tradition. 
Though no longer enshrined in the armor of constitutional or legislative 
institutions (the Union Fran~aise, the Loi-Cadre, the Community), it neverthe-
less remains couched--one might almost say "codified"--in the form of a highly 
normalized set of binding documents ( the Cooperation agreements) underpinned 
by a number of multilateral agencies (Franc Zone, "Francophonie," 0CAM, 
Franco-African summits, etc.). This preference for structured linkages may be 
a reflection of France's legalistic formalism and passion for explicitness, 
but it may also betray a sense of insecurity and an uncomfortable lack of 
confidence in one's ability to maintain influence in the absence of formal 
contractual obligations. 
If the essence of successful neo-colonialism is the ability to assume a 
low visibility and to maintain control (notably economic control) without the 
support of an institutionalised form of dependency, then France has been one 
of the least effective of neo-colonialist powers since its power in Africa has 
consistently been based on a far more explicit (and thus far more visible) set 
of deliberate linkages than that of other non-Communist powers. The same 
penchant for hierarchically structured relationships, for command rather than 
consensus, for imperative rather than cooperative interaction, is also 
observable, of course, in the domestic operation of French social institutions. 
French Neo-Colonialism in Action 
A central premise of this paper is that French intervention (in its 
broadest sense) in the affairs of its African ex-colonies cannot be understood 
in isolation from the total phenomenon of neo-colonialism. Just as inter-
national law recognizes as pennanent aggression the situation where a state 
continues to occupy by force the territory of another state that it has 
willfully and wrongfully invaded, neo-colonialism (like colonialism before it) 
represents a permanent form of intervention. 
The greatest advantage of the system of structured "cooperation" linkages 
between France and its ex-colonies is that it institutionalizes, and therefore 
routinizes, continued French presence--and, hence, French involvement in the 
political and economic processes of the dependent country. An African country 
where a substantial majority of senior managerial positions were staffed by 
11 
Soviet nationals would promptly (and rightly) be branded as a satellite, yet 
this is the situation that has prevailed over the past twenty years in most of 
the ex-French territories without occasioning more than a shrug or a cynical 
wink. 
Apart from the fact that France is a member of the Western alliance, and 
that other major Western powers have their own spheres of influence in the 
Third World which they control as effectively (if not always as directly) as 
France controls hers, one probable reason why the French presence in Africa is 
treated as a matter of course is because it involves an ex-colonial power and 
fits a comfortable racist stereotype which assumes that Africans are totally 
incapable of running their societies unless white men quietly pull the 
strings. Beyond such considerations, however, the fact that French influence 
is technically wielded at the request of "sovereign" African states in the 
context of an ongoing, structured and mutually accepted relationship (while it 
does not seem to cut much ice where the Cuban presence in Angola or Ethiopia 
is concerned) is one more reason why modes of control that might otherwise be 
regarded as exorbitant--such as France's control and orientation of the trade 
policies of its African clients through the mechanisms of the Franc Zone--
generate neither criticism, nor even much surprise. 
The sort of French "intervention" which occasionally sounds a jarring note 
and attracts headline attention (outright military action or more covert 
destabilization in Bangui, Ndjamena, Kolwezi, Mauritania or the Comoros) 
represents only an infinitesimal, though highly visible, aspect of the global 
phenomenon of French influence in Africa, and corresponds, in fact, to the 
institutionalized interactions set up in 1960 under the generic name of 
"cooperation." The purpose of the preceding section was to reconstruct the 
way this system came into existence. Space does not allow a detailed analysis 
of the way the system has evolved and operated under every one of its many 
aspects, in each particular country. Instead, the rest of the paper will 
focus primarily on some essential features of French economic and military 
presence in Africa, keeping in mind that these two areas are only parts 
(albeit crucial ones) of a wider, complex system. (French cultural policy, 
for example, would, in itself, deserve a full-length study.) 
Despite its initial uniformity and its highly structured, almost mono-
lithic patterns, the French neo-colonial system in Africa has, over the years, 
turned out to be far more adaptable and tactically flexible than is commonly 
assumed. Though they were originally cut from the same mold, the cooperation 
agreements are, after all, bilateral, which means that they can be, and 
occasionally are, renegotiated to fit the special conditions in a given client 
state. Furthermore, because their actual implementation depends ultimately on 
French discretion (regarding, e.g., the volume of aid, or the kind and extent 
of military protection extended to a given state), French policy can be 
modulated to fit circumstantial political fluctuations (e.g., in Mali, 
Mauritania, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville or Madagascar), or France's own reapprais-
als (e.g., the Jeanneney report, or the strategic doctrine of couverture a 
distance) without seriously jeopardizing its long-term effectiveness or 
continuity. Today, despite the conceptual unity of the system and the 
persistence of obvious similarities, the local modalities, and even to some 
extent the intensity of French influence differ from country to country. 
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With some debatable exceptions, however (e.g., Chad, Mauritania or 
Madagascar), there is no clear evidence that France's ability to make allow-
ances for local sensitivities has resulted in any significant reduction in the 
aggregate amount of influence it wields on the continent. Contrary to popular 
belief, the multiplication of spectacular interventions in recent years (to 
the extent that they betray a major malfunctioning of the neo-colonial system) 
is not indicative of an expansion of French influence, but apart from such 
embarrassing slippages, France has quietly bolstered its presence in Guinea 
(where it has recovered its pre-1958 position as that country's chief economic 
partner), in Mali ( which has now returned to orthodox Franc Zone membership 
after attempting for many years to maintain a semi-detached relationship), and 
of course, in some non-formerly-French states such as Zaire and even Guinea-
Bissau. 
Increased tactical flexibility largely reflects France's growing self-
confidence in its role as a neo-imperialist power. To the extent that the 
past twenty years have not witnessed any real lessening of the dependency and 
relative underdevelopment of the African states (quite possibly the reverse, 
in fact), there is less need than ever for France to cling narrowly to the 
letter of unequal treaties which are an easy target for radical critics and a 
source of embarrassment to her African clients, when their continued subservi-
ence is, in fact, far more effectively guaranteed by their mounting indebted-
ness, by their growing imbrication in the capitalist trade system, and by the 
corruption and self-indulgence of their leaders. 
De Gaulle's willingness to write off the second (or revamped) community 
once the network of cooperative agreements (and the UAM) had made it redundant 
was the earliest manifestation of this flexibility. In the words of a French 
jurist: 
From the moment that it accepted the independence of its 
members, 
voluntary 
that such 
in turn, 
achieving 
the Community could not dispense with their 
cooperation, but conversely, from the moment 
voluntary cooperation was forthcoming, it could, 
dispense with the Community while nevertheless 
the same purpose.3 
Another early sign of flexibility was France's cynical recognition of the 
fact that, while the operation of a neo-colonial system requires compliant 
indigenous partners, their specific identity is, in the final analysis, 
relatively unimportant. Over the four years extending from the Loi-Cadre to 
independence, France was inordinately concerned with (and therefore actively 
intervened in) the process whereby a set of indigenous leaders were being put 
in charge of the different African territories. The fact that France was 
itself in a process of political turmoil and experienced a high changeover 
rate in its political and senior bureaucratic personnel during that four-year 
period made its attempts to ensure the emergence of interlocuteurs valables 
(i.e., accomodating African partners) less consistent than it might have been, 
but in most cases the candidates competing for co-optation were reassuringly 
interchangeable in their moderation. 
As long as African politicians had been considered primarily in terms of 
their ability to alter the fragile equilibrium of France's domestic party 
system, French politicans and their agents in Africa, the colonial governors 
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(most of whom owed their career to partisan loyalty) could attach a great deal 
of importance to the question of whether to back a Lamine Gueye or a Senghor, 
a Leon M'ba against an Aubame, or a Youlou over an Opangault, variously 
identified with the Christian-Democratic MRP, the Social-Democratic SFIO, the 
Gaullist RPF or the left-of-center UDSR. In the context of the new system 
that was taking shape between 1956 and 1960, however, such preoccupations soon 
became irrelevant since most African leaders were clearly ready to preserve 
privileged ties with France. 
The illusion of decisive change and conflict between radically different 
options was promoted, in part, by the fact that the French administration had, 
for years, insisted on regarding the RDA as a radically subversive party. 
Even though Houphouet-Boigny had taken pains to repudiate this image as early 
as 1950, it was not until several years later that the RDA was certified as 
"safe." This record of French hostility (now replaced by an attitude of 
benevolent neutrality) combined with the RDA' s populist tradition gave it a 
tremendous appeal in the 1957 elections--held, for the first time, under 
universal suffrage--and swept it into power in a majority of territories. The 
sense of upheaval created by the 1957 elections was, in many cases, unwar-
ranted, but there is no doubt that, if only because of the size of the 
electorate involved, they generated for the leaders of the new African 
administrations a legitimacy which they later used to certify to their baffled 
followers, first the merits of the commnity, then those of the cooperation 
agreements. 
French Military Protection and Political Stability 
In this transitional period, France was still actively involved in 
securing the enthronement of its proteges, or in easing out "unreliable" 
leaders (e.g., in Cameroun, or Niger). After independence, however, the logic 
of neo-colonialism demanded that the African incumbents should carry the 
responsibility of ensuring their own political survival by whatever means they 
thought appropriate. Every defense agreement nevertheless included an 
insurance" clause promising French military support not only against external 
aggression, but also against domestic upheavals. 
It soon appeared, however, that the value of this insurance policy 
depended entirely upon France's willingness to honor it. In Cameroun, where 
France had been involved in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign since 
1955, military activities simply continued, presumably under the terms of the 
defense agreement ( the terms of which had not been made public). In August, 
1960, on the other hand, French troops not only declined to save the Mali 
federation, but through their presence in Dakar, deterred any attempt by the 
federal authorities to forcibly prevent Senegal's divorce from Soudan. In 
December, 1962, French forces stepped in the midst of a domestic constitu-
tional and political conflict between Senegalese President Senghor and Prime 
Minister Mamadou Dia and settled it in favor of Senghor, who thereupon had Dia 
thrown in jail. In Togo, where President Olympia had declined to sign a 
formal defense agreement with France, the credibility of the insurance clause 
was not, strictly speaking, in question, but the 1963 overthrow of neutralist 
Olympia was hardly viewed as a great loss in Paris, since it led to the ascent 
of President Grunitzky, who hastened to bring his country in line with the 
other ex-French states by signing all the requisite bilateral agreements. In 
Benin (then Dahomey), which had been a somewhat reluctant partner in the 
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regional arrangements concocted by France and the Ivory Coast, the October 
1963 uprising turned out to be a victory for the faction that was closest to 
the Ivory Coast (and consequently, to France), so that Paris had no real 
interest in backing the Maga-Apithy regime against its opponents--and accord-
ingly, did not. 
The case of Congo-Brazzaville (August, 1963) was again somewhat different: 
there, a regime which had been particularly compliant (to the point of serving 
as a willing conduit for France's efforts to hasten Lumumba's overthrow and to 
encourage Tshombe's secession) was challenged by urban popular demonstrations 
organized by the labor unions. Although the prospect of having to cast French 
troops against the urban populace was not an attractive one, France might have 
reconciled itself to it if it had not been for the fact that Youlou's team of 
European "advisors" notoriously included several suspected sympathizers of the 
ultra-rightist OAS (Secret Army Organization), which had attempted to assas-
sinate De Gaulle a few months earlier. Youlou was therefore abandoned to his 
fate--the first of a long list of expendable leaders to which the names of 
Dacko, Yameogo, Tombalbaye, Malloum, Tsiranana and Bokassa were to be later 
added. Shortly thereafter, however, France also demonstrated that it was 
prepared to intervene even in the absence of a formal request when it rescued 
and reinstated Gabon's Leon M'ba, who had been abducted by the authors of a 
military putsch before he had had a chance to place a phone call to Paris. 
Over the years, therefore, it became gradually obvious that only a handful 
of African leaders (Senghor and Houphouet, to be sure, but also possibly 
Ahidjo, M'ba and his hand-picked successor, Omar Bongo) could be assured of a 
lifelong personal coverage under France's military insurance policy, but that 
other regimes could be sacrificed (whether suddenly, or after a decent 
interval, as in the case of Tombalbaye and Malloum) in the interests of 
expediency. 
The fact that those leaders entitled to preferential protection happen to 
rule over four countries where the bulk of French economic interests are 
concentrated is not without significance, but the logic of French intervention 
is not always directly or exclusively governed by economic considerations. 
For the more expendable leaders, at any rate, France's selective protection 
policy may serve as a permanent reminder of the need to remain in Paris' good 
graces, especially since there is good reason to believe that, on several 
occasions, France has found ways of letting ambitious officers know that it 
would not object to their taking over (e.g., in Upper Volta, the Central 
African Republic or Niger). 
France's apparent willingness to take African political instability in 
stride has its limits, however. France equanimity in the face of sudden 
regime changes is clearly predicated on the assumption that whatever regime 
may come to power in a small impoverished African state will inevitably be 
compelled by situational imperatives to preserve its "special relationship" 
with Paris. This smug tolerance may even extend to regimes which ostensibly 
affect a radical ideological stance (e.g., Congo-Brazzaville), but it can 
rapidly wear thin when French policies or interests are actually challenged: 
the involvement of Gilbert Bourgeaud (alias Bob Denard) in the 1977 abortive 
attenpt against the Kerekou government of Benin and in the succesful 1978 
overthrow of the Soilih regime in the Comoros is illustrative of a form of 
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French intervention for which the pattern was set by Jacques Foccart. 
It should be noted, however, that deviance from some of the orthodox 
channels of French influence does not necessarily spill over into other 
areas. Daring assertions of ideological independence by Benin and Congo-
Brazzaville, for instance, have not led them to repudiate formal cooperation 
agreements or to desert the Franc Zone. Conversely, Mauritania's decision to 
leave the Franc Zone and to launch its own currency did not affect that 
country's tolerance of French mining interests, nor did it prevent it from 
receiving sustained (albeit ineffectual) French military assistance during the 
three years when it tried to occupy a portion of the Western Sahara and to 
cope with the Polisario insurgents. Similarly, despite its rapprochement with 
France after the 1968 overthrow of Modibo Keita, Mali persisted until early 
1981 in its attempt to maintain a separate currency, and France obliged with 
ad hoc arrangements that provided Mali with some of the benefits of Franc Zone 
membership. Madagascar ostensibly left the Franc Zone after its revolution, 
but the strict parity of the French and Malagasy Francs has nevertheless been 
maintained--presumably as a result of a tacit arrangement with Paris.4 
Aside from relying increasingly on the structural constraints of economic 
dependency rather than upon the personality of specific African leaders or on 
their formal adherence to the institutions of neo-colonialism in order to 
maintain its African sphere of influence, France has also revised its inter-
vention policy in the light of changing strategic and logistical realities. 
The end of the Algerian war altered many of the geopolitical considerations 
that had guided the thinking of French military circles. In fact, as early as 
November, 1961, General De Gaulle had emphasized, in an address to army 
commanders, the need to rely on an intervention force rather than on the 
permanent stationing of large contingents overseas: 
Since the relative distance berween continents is continu-
ally being reduced, there is no longer any danger or 
conflict anywhere in which a world power--and consequently 
France--is not interested. . . Thus, a land-, sea-, and 
air-force of intervention designed to act any time, 
anywhere is, in effect, a necessity for France."5 
The actual implementation of De Gaulle's plan was not completed until the 
end of 1963 and benefited significantly ( in terms of logistical sophistica-
tion, if not in terms of strategic conceptualization) from the demonstration 
effect of the "Big Lift" exercise staged by the U.S. in 1963. That operation 
showed that logistical advances (and notably the development of heavy, 
long-distance air carriers) made it possible to thin down the actual physical 
presence of military units in key strategic locations, and that deterrence 
could be achieved as a result of the demonstrated possibility of rapid and 
relatively massive intervention from outlying bases. 
Thus, the number of French troops stationed overseas, which had already 
been reduced from 60,000 in 1960 (excluding Algeria) to 35,000 in 1963 could 
be thinned down even further. In Senegal alone, French military presence was 
drastically scaled down from 27,800 in 1960 to 6,600 to 1965, and to 900 to 
1,200 since the late 1970s. A military infrastructure (including ground 
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facilities, overflight rights, and maintenance personnel) needs to be main-
tained, of course, but the highly visible and thus politically sensitive 
quartering of large French contingents on African soil of a semi-permanent 
basis can be substantially reduced. 
For all its appealing features, this strategy of couverture a distance has 
serious shortcomings, as the U.S. later discovered in Southeast Asia. While 
eminently suited to swift, "surgical" interventions (as recently demonstrated 
in Bangui), it was not designed to deal with generalized, or even low-level 
insurgency, with wars of attrition, with guerrilla operations, or with 
cross-border infiltrations. Such conditions were met in Chad, where French 
intervention over a dozen years was unable to defeat the Northern insurgents 
or even to ensure the victory of the rebel faction it had finally chosen to 
back faute de mieux. By contrast, French intervention easily (if not alto-
gether elegantly) managed to eliminate Tombalbaye, then Malloum, to co-opt 
Hissene Habre without ever achieving any lasting stabilization. In 
Mauritania, where France wisely abstained from becoming involved in ground 
operations, air missions were unable to prevent the Polisario insurgents from 
crippling the operation of the Zouerate mines from cutting the country's only 
rail line and even from staging two daring raids against the capital city. 
Even in -Zaire, where insurgent activity was far more localized and 
improvised, the much-publicized intervention by the Foreign Legion at Kolwezi 
was far from conclusive, since the FNLC insurgents, who had actually evacuated 
the city hours before the French attack, were able to withdraw without any 
losses. As a political operation, however, it was remarkably successful--not 
least because it created between the Giscard and Mobutu regimes a solidarity 
based on their common need to distort reality: about the inglorious behavior 
of the Zairean forces who fled from the rebel advance but massacred African 
and expatriate civilians or about the comic-opera posture of the Foreign 
Legion who stormed onto a position already abandoned by the enemy, about the 
number of expatriate victims, the fact that most of them were killed by 
Zairean army deserters and looters or that they might have been peacefully 
evacuated (as were all the U.S. nationals), and about the alleged role of 
Angolan, Cuban or East German advisers, which never was documented. 
Aside from its significance as part of France I s longstanding effort to 
extend its political and military influence in Zaire, the operation also 
served to dramatize the credibility of French military protection at a time 
when its ineffectiveness in Chad and Mauritania was becoming increasingly 
apparent, and on the eve of a Franco-African summit scheduled to deal with 
issues of military cooperation. And while President Giscard I s plan for a 
permanent French-backed "inter-African force" received only lukewarm support 
at that summit meeting, France's ability to persuade Morocco, Senegal, Togo, 
the Ivory Coast and Gabon to contribute to a joint peace-keeping force to be 
stationed in Shaba offered evidence of its leverage on some African states. 
The fact that the Kolwezi operation could not have taken place if the U.S. had 
not agreed to supply carrier aircraft to ferry French (and Belgian) contin-
gents to Zaire, however, was a further indication of the limits of France I s 
capacity for independent intervention and lent some weight to the disparaging 
comment that the French were merely acting as les Cubains de l'Occident. 
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Economic Dependency: Trade and the Franc Zone 
The importance of France's economic ties with Africa, and particularly 
with her former African dependencies, is more complex and more elusive. 
France herself consistently downplays the economic significance of such ties, 
and takes pain to project the image of a policy governed by humanitarian 
considerations and by a sense of moral obligation toward the population of her 
former dependencies. In a recent appearance on West German television, 
President Giscard dismissed as "insulting and stupid" the idea that France 
might be seeking economic advantages in those African countries where she had 
mounted interventions, claiming that these countries are "among the twenty-
four poorest in the world," have "no natural or mineral resources" and survive 
entirely on French assistance.6 
Even allowing for Giscard's usual sanctimoniousness and for the fact that 
West German television viewers might have only a dim awareness of Central 
Africa's diamonds, Mauritania's iron and copper ores or Chad's cotton (not to 
mention Shaba' s not insubstantial mineral wealth), such a statement may be 
less than wholly credible. Yet, France can point out that the total value of 
her trade with members of the Franc Zone (including DOM/TOMs) represents only 
4 percent ( 1978) of the combined value of her exports and imports, and that 
the African members of the Franc Zone account for a mere 3.4 percent of her 
exports, and for 2.29 percent of her imports in that same year.7 In fact, a 
more accurate assessment of Africa's contributions to France's trade would 
show that in 1977, all African states (including South Africa) actually 
absorbed nearly 15 percent of France's exports and supplied approximately 9 
percent of her imports (with oil alone accounting for nearly one-fourth of 
those imports).8 
Even if we limit ourselves to the African members of the Franc Zone, the 
fact that their commercial links with France represent only a small portion of 
France's total external trade tells only a part of the story. For one thing, 
it gives no idea of the importance of France as a trading partner for each of 
the countries in question. A more detailed examination of the statistical 
evidence, however, confirms France's vital role as a client and supplier for 
the African members of the Franc Zone. 
FRANCE'S SHARE IN THE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF AFRICAN FRANC ZONE COUNTRIES, 1976 
Country % Exports to France % Imports from France 
Benin 31.0 29.9 
Cameroon 25.4 44.5 
Central African Republic 44.4 45.5 
Chad 14. 9 57.3 
Comoros 57.4 30.0 
Congo 15. 9 47.1 
Gabon 42.1 68.7 
Ivory Coast 25.4 38.4 
Mali 30.8 40. 1 
Niger 54.0 43.4 
Senegal 45.5 40.7 
Togo 28.2 33.2 
Upper Volta 26.3 44.4 
Source: Zone Franc; IMF 
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In other words, while African members of the Franc Zone may occupy a 
limited place in the aggregate pattern of France's external trade, the reverse 
clearly does not apply. Both as a client and as a supplier, France remains 
far and away the leading trading partner for all Franc Zone members. In fact, 
this is equally true of those former French African dependencies which have 
left the Franc Zone: in 1976, Madagascar and Mauritania (which technically 
left the Franc Zone in 1973) sold 28.8 percent and 21. 7 percent of their 
exports to France, respectively, while obtaining 54.3 perent and 44.3 percent 
of their imports from France. Even Guinea, which for all practical purposes 
left the Franc Zone in 1958, carried nearly one-fifth of its trade with France 
in 1976, and the former metropole has resumed her place as that country's 
leading trade partner since 1977. 
The predominance of commercial ties between African territories and their 
former colonial power is, of course, not unusual: Great Britain, Belgium and 
even (in Somalia's case) Italy, have continued to be major trading partners 
for their former dependencies, but nowhere has this pattern been more evident 
or more resilient than in the case of ex-French Africa. The following table 
illustrates the persistence of commercial ties between France and her former 
African possessions by comparing, for each of these countries, the lowest and 
highest shares of their respective exports to, and imports from, France over 
two periods of three years, one in the late 1960s and the other in the late 
1970s. With a few notable exceptions (Gabon, Togo and Upper Volta, for their 
imports; the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Mali and Upper Volta 
for their exports), the overall pattern suggests a slight reduction of France's 
PERSISTENCE OF TRADING PATTERNS BETWEEN FRANCE AND HER FORMER AFRICAN COLONIES 
1966-68/1976/78 
Country 
Benin 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Congo 
Gabon 
Ivory Coast 
Madagascar+ 
Mali++ 
Mauritania+ 
Niger 
Senegal 
Togo 
Upper Volta 
% Exports to France 
1966-1968 1976-1978 
35-53 
38-39 
37-42 
49-57 
10-ll 
36-45 
35-39 
33-46 
9-16 
21-31 
55-77 
66-80 
39-40 
14-16 
25-31* 
25-31 
44-63 
na 
14-27* 
21-42* 
23-26 
25-34/f 
21-31/f 
22-24* 
54-64* 
45-48* 
21-39* 
15-48* 
Source: Zone Franc; IMF 
* 1975-1977 
** 1973-1975 
# 1974-1976 
+ left the Franc Zone in 1973 
++ not a member of the Franc Zone in 1966-68 
% Imports from France 
1966-1968 1976-1978 
50-52 
53-58 
55-61 
46-50 
58-61 
59-60 
51-58 
63-65 
30-39 
55-57 
48-52 
44-53 
30-32 
44-45 
23-25* 
42-45 
46-58 
37-42** 
47-50* 
67-69* 
38-40 
36-55/f 
24-40 
44-49* 
30-43* 
37-41* 
33-35* 
44-45* 
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commercial predominance. Considering that Africa's trade with LDCs and 
Socialist countries has continued to stagnate at a very low level (16.4 
percent in 1964-69 and 16.8 percent in 1973-78), this gradual shift in the 
direction of Francophonic Africa's trade has been to the almost exclusive 
benefit of other capitalist industrial countries--notably France's EEC 
partners. This limited multi-lateralization is largely due to the gradual 
elimination of protectionist practices and preferential inducements (such as 
the well-known surprix) whereby France managed to maintain privileged trading 
relations with her ex-colonies. The modernization and the increasing competi-
tiveness of her economy have also contributed to mitigate France's tradition-
ally autarkic philosophy which, for decades--and even centuries--had led her 
to draw the largest possible share of her basic needs from her own imperial 
domain (often at a higher cost to her consumers). 
Yet, while the days when France accounted for two-thirds of AOF / AE.F' s 
trade movement9 are clearly gone, her continued importance for the economies 
of her former African dependencies can hardly be overemphasized. Indeed, 
where certain vital resources are concerned (e.g., uranium or oil and natural 
gas), France's insistence on securing preferential access through bilateral 
agreements illustrates the persistence of her autarkic attitudes. 
In their trade with France, most African members of the Franc Zone end up 
as net importers. In 1977, for instance, only Niger and the Central African 
Republic showed a trade surplus in their exchanges with France. In 1976, the 
African members of the Franc ZonelO collectively registered a FF 1,599 
million trade deficit toward France. In that same year, however these 
countries reaped a FF 2,541 m. surplus from their trade with countries outside 
the Franc Zone, and although this surplus weighed relatively little in the 
overall trade deficit of the Franc Zone (FF 46,200 mil., of which FF 41, 766 
m. was generated by France alone), it nevertheless balanced the substantial 
deficit incurred by the DOM/TOMs (whose combined population is only 2.5 
percent of that of the African members) in their trade with non-Franc Zone 
members (FF 2,670 m.). In fact, only five of the thirteen African members of 
the Franc Zone ( Gabon, Ivory Coast, Cameroun, Congo and the Central African 
Republic) actually register a surplus in their trade with non-Zone members. 
The modest trade surplus which Niger had begun to achieve during the 1970s was 
largely derived from its sale of uranium to France, and the seven other states 
regularly show negative balances whether in their trade with France or with 
non-Zone members. In 1977, those five African states which, alone among all 
members of the Franc Zone, earned a net surplus from their trade with the 
outside world, had accumulated positive balances totalling FF 6,981 mil. 
against non-Zone members, with Gabon and the Ivory Coast respectively account-
ing for 58 percent and 30 percent of that trade surplus. 
In sum, the African members of the Franc Zone represent a small yet 
significant market for French products and a source of primary commodities 
that is all the more accessible because French imports from these countries do 
not require any outlay of foreign exchange. Similarly, Franc Zone membership 
operates as a built-in incentive for the purchase of French goods by the 
African states, despite the ostensible elimination of preferential trading 
clauses. In this respect, and despite the potential multilateralization of 
commercial linkages fostered by EEC-EAMA and EEC-APC association agreements, 
the Franc Zone has continued to function in a semi-autarkic perspective. 
Taken as a group, the African members contribute a net surplus to the Zone's 
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foreign exchange reserves, but the viability of this arrangement depends on 
the continued affiliation of a small number of countries--notably Gabon and 
the Ivory Coast--whose exchange-earning capacity underwrites the survival of 
France's sphere of influence. 
French Aid Policy 
While debate continues over the definition of "development, 11 or over the 
effects for Third World countries of economic growth (genuine or perverse) in 
a capitalist framework, there is no longer any serious question that II aid" (or 
what passes for it) is, in all essential respects, a policy instrument whereby 
the industrialized countries, individually or collectively, can penetrate 
Third World societies or stabilize their influence in former colonial 
areas. ll While maintaining (like all donors) the fiction that humanitarian 
concerns are a primary motivation of its aid policies, France has been more 
explicitly cynical than most nee-colonialist powers in using its assistance as 
a carrot-and-stick combination in order to secure African acquiescence to the 
restructuring of its sphere of influence. 
France enjoys (and cultivates) the reputation of being a generous aid-
giver, and while this is by and large true (in terms of aid volume, if not of 
motivations), the view has to be qualified in several respects. The magnitude 
of French governmental aid reflects a deliberate willingness on the part of 
the state to use public funds to preserve or further in its former colonies 
(and, to a lesser extent, in other Third World countries) economic, cultural 
and political conditions favorable to the development of French private 
interests. 
In absolute amounts, France is the second largest source of official 
development aid (ODA) next to the U.S., with contributions of $3·,370 million 
(or 11.5 percent of all ODA) in 1979. Her effort in this regard amounts to 
0.59 percent of her GNP, nearly three times the share that the U.S. devotes to 
ODA (0.20 percent in 1979). France also leads the ex-colonial powers in terms 
of the portion of her GNP allocated to ODA (Belgium: 0.56 percent; U.K.: 0.52 
percent). On the other hand, several countries now devote a much larger share 
of their GNP to ODA than does France: this is particularly true of the OPEC 
countries (Saudi Arabia: 3.13 percent; the UAEs: 5.42 percent; Kuwait: 5.14 
percent; Qatar: 5.6 percent; Iraq: 2.94 percent), and of the small countries 
of Northern Europe (Sweden: 0.94 percent; Norway: 0.93 percent; Netherlands: 
0.93 percent; Denmark: 0.75 percent). 
Furthermore, French aid as a percentage of her GNP steadily declined 
through the 1960s and the 1970s, while that same indicator was on the rise for 
most aid-giving countries. As a percentage of the GNP, French aid declined 
from 0.66 percent in 1970 to 0.57 percent in 1978, while over the same period, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the OPEC nations increased 
the volume of their development assistance, both in absolute and in relative 
terms. 
Year 
% GNP 
1962 
1.76 
1963 
1.38 
FRENCH AID AS PERCENTAGE OF GNP 
1964 
1.26 
1970 
0.66 
1975 
0.62 
1976 
0.62 
1977 
0.60 
1978 
0.57 
1979 
0.59 
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Another significant factor has to do with the way in which each donor's 
aid package is distributed. As a rule, bilateral aid is generally regarded as 
more narrowly tied to the furthering of the donor's national interests, and 
thus, more susceptible of being used for political leverage than multilateral 
assistance, In this light, it should be noted that France consistently 
devotes a much larger share of its ODA to bilateral projects than all other 
DAC (OECD) countries. In 197 8, 65. 7 percent of the ODA supplied by the DAC 
member countries went to bilateral assistance, while France channeled 87. 7 
percent of her aid through bilateral programs. 
The breakdown of DAC assistance between bi- and multilateral programs can 
be summarized as follows: 
MULTILATERAL VS. BILATERAL ODA FROM DAC MEMBER COUNTRIES 
Country % Multilateral* % Bilateral 
1970 1978 1979 1970 1978 1979 
Australia 9.8 29.1 26.9 90.2 70.9 73.1 
Austria 57.1 26.9 55.5 42.9 73.1 44.5 
Belgium 23.4 41.8 32.1 76.6 58.2 67.9 
Canada 19.5 38.5 45.7 80.5 61.5 54.3 
Denmark 36.8 44.0 45.3 63.2 56.0 54.7 
Finland 83.3 58.8 57.1 16.7 41.2 42.8 
France 10.6 12.3 16.9 89.4 87.7 83.1 
West Germany 21.9 33.3 36.4 78.1 66.7 63.6 
Italy 56.3 92.9 88.9 43.7 7.1 11.1 
Japan 17.4 30.4 26. 9 82. 6 69.6 73.1 
Netherlands 21.3 26.8 31.2 78.7 73.2 68.8 
New Zealand 21.7 17.6 23.3 78.3 82.4 76.7 
Norway 59.4 46.1 41.9 40.6 53.9 58.1 
Sweden 45.9 39.3 35.1 54.1 60.7 64.9 
Switzerland 40.0 42.1 47.6 60.0 57.9 52.4 
United Kingdom 17.9 41.3 44.2 82.1 58.7 55.8 
United States 15.6 38.5 15.0 84.4 61.5 85.0 
(Total DAC) (17.6) (34.3) (28.6) (82.4) (65.7) (71.4) 
Source: OECD 
* Includes contributions through EEC 
In fact, France devotes a smaller portion of her GNP to multilateral develop-
ment funds than any other member of the OECD's Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), when her assessed contributions to the EEC are excluded. In 
1978-79, France allocated only 0.05 percent of her GNP (9.2 percent of her 
total aid for these two years) to multilateral development funds, compared to 
ranges of 0.3 to 0.4 percent for Norway, Sweden and Denmark, and of 0.15 to 
0.21 percent for Canada, Australia, Great Britain or the Benelux countries. 
Futhermore, any assessment of France's aid policies must take into account 
the fact that roughly one-half of bilateral aid flows are directed toward 
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France's Overseas Departments and Territories (DOM/TOMs), whose combined 
population (1,469,000 in 1979) represents less than two-thirds of that of Togo 
alone.12 A substantial portion of the flows going to the DOMs, for example, 
actually represents statutory transfers which, under French law, are incumbent 
upon the central government for the benefit of local administrative units, 
public agencies and certain catagories of French citizens. 
The distribution of French bilateral aid in 1979 thus went as follows: 
DOM/TOM ••••••••••••••••••••••.••.•••• 50% 
Countries covered by 
the Ministry for Cooperation •••••• 29% 
Maghre b •••••••••••••.•••••.••••••••••• 8% 
Other LDCs •••••••••••••••••••••••..•• 13% 
Not only does France allocate a much higher share of her aid than other 
OECD countires to bilateral programs: she also devotes a larger portion of 
that bilateral assistance to technical cooperation programs, most of it in the 
form of remunerations paid to French technical assistance personnel. In 1979, 
59. 2 percent of France's bilateral aid (49. 2 percent of her total ODA) was 
allocated to technical cooperation programs. The percentage of total ODA 
devoted to technical cooperation projects by the DAG member countries between 
1970 and 1979 is presented in the following table: 
Countr 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
West Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
(All DAG) 
Source: OECD 
TECHNICAL COOPERATION AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ODA 
1970 1978 
6.4 7.3 
28.6 18.5 
43.5 34.5 
12.2 5.8 
18.4 17.3 
n 25.0 
45.4 50. 9 
31.2 29.7 
12.5 14.3 
4.3 8.7 
19.7 21.9 
21. 7 29.4 
12.5 10.0 
18.4 11.1 
6.7 5.0 
23.1 19.1 
18.8 7. 4 
(23.5) (20.0) 
1979 
7.7 
26.3 
33.9 
4.3 
17.3 
33.3 
49.2 
25. 0 
25.0 
7. 7 
20. 4 
30.0 
8.6 
9.6 
4.8 
19.2 
10.0 
(20.0) 
23 
In 1978, French contributions to bilateral technical cooperation programs 
totalled $1,389.5 million, or 36.75 percent of the aggregate amount devoted to 
such programs by all DAC countries. In that same year, the number of French 
state-sponsored technical assistance personnel serving in developing countries 
(27,068) exceeded the combined total of all such personnel supplied by the 
other eight EEC countries. Of that number, 75.7 percent (or 20,490 persons) 
were teachers, most of them based in Africa. This represented more than twice 
the number of government-sponsored teaching personnel (9,269) jointly supplied 
by all other OECD countries.13 
Aside from governmental aid, private flows from France to developing 
countries added up to $5,315 million in 1979 (vs. $5,224 million in 1978). 
These consisted, for the most part, of bank loans ($2,311 m., or 43.5 percent) 
and supplier's credits ($1,801 m., or 33.9 percent). Direct investments (up 
55 percent from 1978) amounted only to $681 million, of which nearly 40 
percent went to Spain alone (Spain being officially defined as a "developing 
country" by the DAC. Thus, the total of public and private flows from France 
to all developing areas (including such recipients as Spain or the DOM/TOMs) 
added up in 1979 to $8,685 million, or 1.52 percent of France's GNP, compared 
to $7,929 million (1.67 percent of GNP) in 1978. 
Private flows from France to the LDCs (at market terms) represent 10. 72 
percent of the total of private flows from all DAC countries (vs. 25.56 
percent for the U.S., 19. 08 percent for the U .K. and 11. 12 percent for 
Switzerland). More significantly, even after its 55 percent increase from 
1978 to 1979, French direct investment in all developing countries represented 
only 5. 05 percent of the total of such investments by all DAC countries and 
lagged behind the U.S., the U.K., West Germany and Japan. Measured against 
their respective GNPs, France's direct investments also ranked behind those of 
Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Sweden. 
By contrast, supplier's credits which, more than any other type of private 
flows, are likely to be applied to projects and purchases of doubtful value 
for the recipient country (and thus may be expected to involve a higher degree 
of corruption) represent a larger portion (33.9 percent) of all private flows 
than is the case with the U.S., the U.K., Switzerland, Japan, West Germany, 
Belgium or Canada. In absolute amounts, only Italy, among all the DAC 
countries, channels more funds than France into this particular category of 
private flows.14 
As a final note, it should be observed that grants by private voluntary 
agencies to the LDCs absorb only 0.004 percent of France's GNP (a "performance" 
record easily surpassed by all other DAC countries with the exception of Japan 
and Italy.) Such grants by private charitable organizations represent less 
than 0.7 percent of France's official development aid, compared to nearly 22 
percent in the case of the U.S., 24.8 percent for Switzerland, 11.6 percent 
for West Germany, 12. 7 percent for Austria, 6.5 percent for Belgium and 2.8 
percent for the U.K. 
Conclusion 
The picture that emerges from the foregoing data is that of a power whose 
influence is heavily dependent upon governmental policies aimed at the 
devlopment (or preservation) of bilateral links with specific LDCs, with a 
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strong degree of reliance on high-intensity modes of operation (military 
presence, Franc Zone, education). By contrast, the French private sector is 
only moderately aggressive compared to that of other capitalist countries. 
French private interests remain overwhelmingly dominant in the former African 
dependencies (see Appendix II), but despite spectacular political gambles on 
the part of French policy-makers (support for the Biafra, Katanga and Cabinda 
secession attempts, military intenvention in Zaire, sanction-busting in 
Rhodesia), French economic interests have by and large failed to gain any 
substantial footholds outside of their former empire. Even in Zaire, where 
France went to great lengths to court the Mobutu regime (and thus erase the 
negative effect of its earlier support of Tshombe), French investments in 1978 
were only $20 million, compared with Belgium's $6,000 million.15 That stake 
has now been enlarged through Zaire's willingness to offer France a share of 
the SMTF (Tenke-Fungurume) mining project, but it remains to be seen whether 
French interest groups are ready to muster (and risk) the resources needed to 
exploit the openings created by the policy-makers. There, as in other parts 
of the world, France's reach may not be equal to her ambitions. 
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APPENDIX I 
FRENCH MILITARY TROOPS IN AFRICA, 1980* 
Central African Republic......................... • . . . . . . . • 350 
Chad ........•.....•............•........................•. 1,800 
Djibouti .................................................. 4, 150 
Ivory Coast............................................... 450 
Mauritania................................................ 250 
Senegal ................................................... 1, 170 
Total. .•••.•...•.•.•.••.••....••• 8,665 
* Exclusive of instructors and exports seconded to African governments. 
APPENDIX II 
SHARE OF FRENCH INTERESTS IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR OF 10 AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
(See p. 27) 
APPENDIX II 
SHARE OF FOREIGN AND FRENCH INTERESTS IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR OF 10 FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN STATES (in%~ 
Conso R.C.A. Cameroon Benin Toso Chad Senegal Niger U. Vo_lta Gabon 
Fisheries: 
Foreign 100 67 
(French) (90) (na) 
Timber Products: 
Foreign 100 88.7 84 80 (French) (na) (77.5) (45) (75) 
Oil· and: Fats: 
Foreign 96.3 69 82 (French) (96. 3) 
Food Products: 
(4.5) (82) 
Foreign 100 78.5 71 29.3 85.5 94 48.5 72.4 (French) (100) (72.5) (na) 
Tobacco: 
(29-:. 3) (85.5) (94) (48.5) (72. 4) 
Foreign 100 100 84.5 85 100 90 90 (French) (100) (100) (84.5) (85) (100) (90) (90) 
Beverages: 
Foreign 97.5 100 79 63.5 37.5 90.3 92.3 95 93.5 (French) (75.5) (50) (67) (18.6) (37. 5) (53. 7) (82.7) (95) (93.5) 
Textiles: 
Foreign 70 9 75 52 59.5 85 82.4 70 38 82 (French) (60) (9) (38) (28) (na) (35) (82. 4) (70) (38) (20) 
Shoes/Leather Prod.: 
Foreign 100 100 66 100 100 100 61 100 (French) (na) (na) (na) (na) (na) 100 (28,5) (na) 
Chemicals & Petrochem.: 
Foreign 83 100 64 60 39.7 50 93 46 45 72 (French) (77) (100) (47 .5) (60) (30.0) (SO) (73.5) (46) (35) (60) 
Building Materials 
Foreign 48 50 59.4 5.5 25 75 (French) (48) (50) (47) (5.5) (25) (37) 
Yiechanical/Metal.-Elect. 
Foreign 86 70 95.8 81.8 
(French) (86) (70) (95. 8) (75.5) 
Metal Transformations: 
"' Foreign 100 76 90 71 96.5 .___, (French) (100) (76) (88) (71) (96.5) 
Printing/Paper Prod,: 
Foreign 50 ciB> c~8> d8:§> d~> (French) (50) 
